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abstract
Before the Civil War (1936-1939), Spain had seen the emergence of firms of complex
organizational forms. However, the conflict and the postwar years changed this pattern.
The argument put forward in this paper is based on historical experience, the efforts will
be addressed to explain the development of Spanish entrepreneurship during the second
half of the twentieth century. To illustrate the change in entrepreneurship and
organizational patterns among the Spanish firms during the Francoist regime we will turn
to the  case of the motor vehicle industry.
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Introduction
As it corresponds to a slow growing and slow modernizing country, Spanish firms
were, by 1930, a mix of national and foreign entrepreneurship with fairly complex
organizational structures. This paper will address two related sets of issues: a) the
change in entrepreneurship patterns among Spanish firms during the four decades of the
Franco régime (1936-1975), and b) the change in organizational patterns.  We suggest
that both issues are related.
We organize the paper as follows.  A short summary of the main entrepreneurship and
organizational features of Spanish business world around 1930 is the content of the
section 1.  The civil war and the second world war developments form the second
section.  The third is devoted to the clash between state and private entrepreneurship
during the autarkic period (1945-1954), as shown with the case study of the motor
industry.  After a short mention to similar experiences in other developing countries
(Egypt and Brazil) we expand the argument to the years 1955-1973, when Spain
increasingly accepted foreign investment and entrepreneurship.  In the sixth section we
come back to the organizational developments during the Franco period, focusing on the
limitations suffered by business organization because of shifting entrepreneurship
patterns.
1. Entrepreneurship, emergence of organizational complexity and accumulation of
organizational capabilities before the Civil War.
Any consideration of entrepreneurial and organizational issues in the pre-1936 Spain has
to begin by the awareness of the size and sectoral specialization of big firms at that moment.
We know the 1930 ranking of big firms (all sectors), classified by assets (see Table 1).
Table 1.  The twenty top Spanish firms  in 1930, classified by theirs assets.
 1. MZA  (railways)
 2. Norte  (railways)
 3. CHADE (electricity)
 4. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power  (electricity)
 5. Banco de España  (banking)
 6. Riegos y Fuerzas del Ebro  (electricity)
 7. R.C.Asturiana  (zinc mining)
 8. S.M.M.Peñarroya  (lead mining)
 9. C.Telefónica  (communications)
10. FFF.CC.Tánger-Fez  (railways)
11. Andaluces  (railways)
12. S.E.Construcción Naval  (shipbuilding)
13. Catalana de Gas  (gas & electricity)
14. Rio Tinto  (copper mining)
15. C.A.Tabacos  (tobacco)
16. C.Transatlántica  (sea transport)
17. CAMPSA  (oil refining and distribution)
18. Oeste  (railways)
19. S.G.Azucarera  (sugar)
20. Banco de Bilbao  (banking)
Source: Carreras & Tafunell (1997)4
This is the map of top business.  There are railway companies -including the two largest.
There are public utilities of various kinds, but mainly electrical. There are also mining
companies.  Among the rest it is worth mentioning the two banks (the central bank and the
largest private commercial bank), and three firms mainly involved in manufacturing
(shipbuilding, tobacco, oil and sugar). The mining companies were also involved in
manufacturing activities, just as the oil company -more oriented towards distribution than to
manufacturing.  Half of them originated from or went through a major merger, facing the
challenges of substantive internal reorganization.  The ownership was private (with some
public involvement in Oeste -formerly a private firm that went bankrupt but that was
supported with public funds because of regional policy- and in CAMPSA -the private
company that managed the oil refining and distribution monopoly establisehd in 1927 after the
nationalization of the assets of all the private firms working in the oil business in Spain).
Foreign capital was predominant in seven, and a strong minority in five.  As the size of the
firms was large enough, the ownership happened to be fragmented and the quotation in the
stock exchange was more the rule than the exception.
As far as the literature allows us to go, all these firms were large and complex enough to
require a lot of investment in organizational capabilities. They had a long tradition of top
management. They were multi-plant or they had large networks.  The need for differentiated
functional offices was not only felt, but fully deployed.  Just as many other smaller firms, they
were offering a real career within the firm for their mid-level managers. We lack the proper
kind of research on this particular point, but all the evidence suggests that lawyers and
engineers were regularly hired and were offered good professional prospects. The industrial
relations were complicated enough to receive detailed attention by specialized managers.  In
quite a few cases (mainly in the railway companies and in the public utilities) a pack of welfare
services was designed for the employees.  The railway companies were also pioneering the
adoption of computers for their internal management.  Taylorism was known and used in
some manufacturing firms, mainly in those fields more congenial with Taylor's approach: steel
works [Vegara, 1971].
On the contrary, there is no hint at all of the adoption of the divisionalized structure.  The
firms involved in more than one major business field were of three kinds: a) mining
companies, involved in more than one product and usually both mining and manufacturing; b)
public utilities, involved in production and distribution; and c) Catalana de Gas, with interests
in gas and electricity.  Lower in the ranking there were companies like the chemicals
(U.E.Explosivos and Cros,S.A.) entering in various related lines of business.  All in all, the
organizational complexity was more an outcome of the scale of the companies than of their
scope.
The predominance of service companies among the largest also meant an internal market
bias.  Only the mining companies were clearly oriented towards the export markets. Indeed,
their foreign ownership was closely related with the knowledge of world markets and
marketing.  The manufacturing firms were more oriented towards the Spanish market. SECN
was the Spanish counterpart of Vickers, associated with Spanish banks and with Spanish
former shipbuiilders. C.A.Tabacos and CAMPSA were private firms exploiting a fiscal
monopoly.  Only S.G.Azucarera could have had some export orientation, but it was
negligible.
The strength of the top Spanish firms by 1930 -just as by 1936- was their size and their
efficient internal organization.  Some of them underwent major labor unrest in the 1910s, and
they learned in the following decade how to avoid internal social turmoil.  All the firms, even
those managing fiscal monopolies, were fully aware of the risks of loosing competitiveness.5
2. A period of conflicts (1936-45)
The situation aforementioned changed dramatically after the Civil War. The Civil War "per
se"  (1936-1939) was extremely damaging for firms organizational structures. Most of the big
firms happened to have their assets and their managers in both sides of the war.  More often
than not, their headquarters were in the Republican side (Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao) while
their owners were fully supportive of the Francoists.  Furthermore, a wave of collectivizations
in the more leftist oriented Republican regions challenged the traditional organizational
schemes of private firms. The outcome was a lot of confusion, a dissolving or an upsetting of
the usual hierarchies and the internalization of civil conflict. Moreover, many middle and top
managers were killed or they had to avoid this fate by running away (this is not to forget that
also many workers were killed -we are simply concentrating on the effects of the war on the
management).
Once the war was over it was difficult to come back to the past equilibrium. So many
people killed, the defeat of one side and the success of the other, the hate between workers
and owners and managers, the dissolution of the trade unions, the sudden reduction in real
wages, the creation of a fascist corporatist movement (the "vertical trade union") -everything
was completely different from the liberal world of the pre-war years.  A committee was
created to organize the return of the collectivized firms back to their owners -but the new
context was not the one dreamed by the defenders of a liberal order.
A fascist, pro-autarky, approach was dominating among the new ruling class.  The
capitalists that were not fully supportive of the Francoist movement did not have an easy
time.  As the market was extensively interfered by new laws and decrees, the political favor
became far more important than economic efficiency and market competitiveness. The
foreign-owned enterprises were seen as politically incorrect -the fascists were extremely
nationalists- and had to support a lot of pressure to sell their firms or to accept new Spanish
majorities among their shareholders.  A movement of ownership transfers from foreign hands
to Spanish (public or private) ones, was set in motion. There was an actively developing
group of public companies in the industry and the tertiary and nationalising “strategic”
sectors [Carreras and Tafunell 1993, 1997]. However, the interventionist system
performed very poorly.  In 1944 Telefónica (an ITT firm) could not renew its licence and
was compensated with 50 milion gold pesetas, cash.  Out of it, the Spanish State created in
1945 the new "Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España"[Little 1985]. Hispano-Suiza
underwent the same fate. The railway companies (that had a lot of foreign capital) were
nationalized between 1942 and 1944.  Vickers had to withdraw from SECN. The foreigners
(mainly Belgians) were kicked off from "Barcelona Traction" and "Riegos" (the biggest
electricity producers), and a close friend of Franco managed to become the new owner of the
firm.  As late as 1954 Riotinto was forced to sell to a consortium of Spanish banks [Gómez-
Mendoza, 1994]. The same year Ford abandoned Spain after 35 years of industrial activity
[Estapé-Triay, 1997a, 1997b].
In each of these cases, the shock of the war was coupled to the shock of a radical change
in ownership and in the general context of the firm. Managers had a bad time and, what is
much worse, the internal organization schemes and culture were partially or wholly distroyed.
Only the firms that in the pre-war years were completely Spanish owned, could continue
without major changes.  It was the case of most of the commercial banks and of some of the
public utilities.  The changes were the most extreme when a nationalization was made:
Telefónica, RENFE, Hispano-Suiza, were cases in point.  There the switch was from (partial
or total) foreign and private ownership to totally Spanish and public.  The top and middle6
management was very much altered, and so did the organizational culture.  The new
managers were, typically, military.  In some cases they had an engineer training, but this was
not always the case.  The engineers had also their chance, mainly when they were
ideologically close to the new Régime.  Both, military and engineers, coincided in a
nationalistic and technical approach that was hostile to the market, to the price system and to
economic efficiency and that supported organizational discipline, the superiority of the State
national interest over the market (expressed in administered prices), and technical feasibility.
They were actively in favor of autarkic policies.
Juan Antonio Suanzes was the most distinguished character among this new class of top
managers [Ballesteros, 1993]. He was a naval engineer working at SECN (Vickers) before
the war.  As a highly qualified technical staff, he became very much resented against Vickers.
He thought that their investment decisions were governed by capitalistic interests that were
inimical to the Spanish ones.  So, some orders that could have been developed at SECN were
passed by Vickers to other firms in the group, outside Spain.  Suanzes hated Vickers because
of this and because the feeling of forced inferiority of Spanish managers as compared with
foreign ones -more congenial with the long term interests of the ownership.  He was close
friend of Franco and after the civil war he was nominated Chairman of the newly created INI
(the Spanish IRI, the Industrial National Agency). He commanded the INI since its creation in
1941 to 1963 [Schwartz and González 1978; Comín and Aceña 1991].  During six years,
from 1945 to 1951, he also was Minister of Industry, and achieved its maximum political
influence.  He created many new firms -all of them named "Empresa Nacional" (National
Enterprise)- in a wide range of manufacturing sectors.  From the Ministry and from the INI
command board, he pushed away from Spain as many foreign capitalists as he could.  He
promoted the military and the engineers to top management responsabilities.  He defined
internal organization structures that were military oriented and with a typical bureaucratic
form.  As his goals were never of an economic nature but of a political, military or national
nature, his system of rewards was more based in political loyalty and, secondly, technical
achievement than in any kind of economic efficiency.
Therefore things were not the same after the civil war. The almost immediate
outbreak of the international conflict and the political and economical options of the new
regime changed the governing co-ordinates of the country. The political system which
emerged after the Civil War (1936-39) sought to make Spain industrially self-sufficient,
especially in the so-called “strategic sectors” and those related with defence. Moreover,
in a situation of scarce resources, during and after the civil war, the promotion of state-
owned enterprise was made to the detriment of private enterprise [Carreras and Tafunell
1997]. In many cases, the prejudice of the state leaders against private ownership went
beyond any economic rationality. It can be stated that Spanish business of the forties and
early fifties, maintained and promulgated by the official authorities, was full of
patriotism. It will be argued that these decades are decisive to understand most of the
country’s backwardness.
2 Indeed, the decisions adopted during the period of the World
War II had consequences in the long run. The economic growth guidelines promoted by
the first Franco regime period from the end of the civil war meant a breaking point with
                                               
2 Catalan has studied the impact of the Second World War in the Spanish economy from a comparative
perspective. He points out, after examining the costs and benefits of the external conflict and the
position of the European neutral economies, that the Second World War, even more than the First
World War, implied a frustrated episode for the Spanish economic development. Indeed, the Francoist
regime, on the one hand, boosted an economic and social policy inspired by those adopted in Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy from the mid-thirties and, on the other hand, they adopted a foreign policy
favourable to both countries during the first years of World War II.  Catalan (1995).7
the development path of the two previous regimes, i.e. the Restoration and the Republic.
Not only did it lose the ground gained with respect the industrialised countries during the
first three decades of the century, but even more importantly it changed the structural
basis of the Spanish economy which has subsequently conditioned her economy until
recently. This structural modification came through a complete break with the
parameters of successful business. Accordingly, the roots of contemporary Spanish
backwardness have to be found, above all, in the origins of the Francoist regime and the
decisions adopted freely by the Spanish authorities of the moment [Catalán 1995].
The implementation of strongly nationalistic economic policies and the eruption of
new forms of business style were determinant for the performance of the already
established foreign concerns. In the Spanish case, autarky and intervention are two
phenomena which cannot be separated when discussing the Spanish post-civil war
economy. The intervention was originally justified because of the necessities of the civil
war. However, it continued even after the war, with the Francoist regime claiming
intervention was necessary to protect the Spanish economy from the effects of the
Second World War. Despite this claim, the economic authorities of the regime, far from
eliminating the existing controls at the end of the Second World War, kept them with
more or less the same intensity for at least fifteen years [Gómez Mendoza 1994].
Furthermore, the role of the government was one of the most influential factors in the
poor performance of the Spanish business economy. After the civil war the State became
responsible for a great deal of the new business promotion. Foreign capital was strongly
limited and many companies were nationalised. These nationalisations took two forms.
On the one hand, “nationalisation” strictly speaking meant the transfer of property rights
from private enterprise to the state-owned firms. On the other hand, in a broader
definition, “nationalisation” meant the process through which the property of a private
foreign company followed into the hands of a private firm whose capital was in the
majority hold by Spanish capitalists. What were the consequences of Franco’s autarkic
policy?
The state intervention after the Spanish Civil opened an era of small and less
competitive firms; definitively smaller than the large previously private ones. The
inheritance of the Francoist period marked and shaped the nature of Spanish business
development. This inheritance was reflected in economic, political and social fields; in the
regulating and legislative framework, of labour relations and, most importantly, in the
development of a managerial and business class influenced for too long by bureaucratical
restraints and military officials of the dictatorship. All this consequently isolated Spain
from its European neighbours.
3. State Entrepreneurship: the intervention of the INI and the emergence of the
Spanish motor industry (1945-54)
The period 1945-1954 was marked not by the elimination of the existing controls and
moves towards a more open regime once the world war ended, but by their strict
maintainment for further years. Economic activity was clouded by the scarcity of raw
materials and basic intermediate products, and no fuel. The rise of publicly owned and
managed firms after 1940 ("national firms") meant an effort to diffuse new organizational
techniques borrowed from Germany and Italy and geared towards economic autarchy.   Only
in the mid-1950s, and after the failure of the previous autarkic strategy, American-oriented
organizational techniques were diffused among Spanish firms.8
In their quest for autarky, the Spanish authorities adopted a set of policies with regard
to industry which included the regulation of private investment, the foundation of public
sector enterprise, quantitative restrictions on foreign trade and the manipulation of the
exchange rate [Donges 1971: 48]. However, the failure of the Spanish industry to
effectively respond to government measures convinced the policy makers of two factors.
Firstly, they were firmly resolved that the market was an ineffective mechanism for the
allocation of resources. Secondly, that Spainish entrepreneurs lacked business acumen.
Thus only through state intervention, it was believed, could the country achieve the goals
of self-sufficiency and rapid industrialisation.
Evidence of the shortcomings of the Francoist regime’s industrial strategy has been
provided by data on factory size. Donges has showed that, on the eve of the Stabilisation
Plan, Spain's industrial structure was dominated by a large number of tiny enterprises,
which comprised eighty five per cent of total industry [Donges 1971]. Even in such
sectors as chemicals, basic ferrous metals, machinery and equipment, where the optimum
size of firms was generally considered to be over a thousand workers, there was still a
predominance of small concerns. Moreover state intervention, linked to the structural
transformations of the Spanish economy, caused profound changes in the sectoral
composition of large companies. The large Spanish firms became smaller with respect to
their counterparts. The motor industry is a case in point.
Politicians, policy makers and military sectors had agreed on the need to industrialise
the country and the motor vehicle industry was a priority target. However, to a certain
extent, the plans of the newly formed regime had already put forward by Primo de Rivera
during the second half of the 1920s, and were simply the culmination of past initiatives.
Indeed, they did not differ very much from those of Primo de Rivera’s period that never
were put in effect. Moreover, the partial nationalisation program might be seen as a
continuation rather than an interruption in the path to full motorisation.
3 As Table 2
illustrates, first, there were projects that might suit the autarkic policy of the regime
regardless of their economic efficiency (that is, a closed economy). And, second, there
also were those projects that could be undertaken in open competition with foreign
concerns (open economy).
4
Table 2.  Activities to be undertaken in Spain according to market and production
possibilities.
Protectionism. The
pursuit of autarkic goals
regardless of cost.
Without Protectionism could be
undertaken in competition with
foreign concerns
Small Cars xx No
Luxury Cars x Yes
Heavy Trucks xxx Doubtful
Buses x Yes
Source: INI Archives, Madrid  Note: the ‘x’ stands for priority
                                               
3 In order to promote a samll core of national manufacturers, the law of the Protection of the Automobile
Industy was passed in 1927. Then, the Republican Government decided to to dictate several conditions
in order to ensure at least a partial nationalisation. This partial nationalisation of manufaturing meant
that local manufacturers supplied materials of more weight and lower level of manufacture. At the end
of the Civil War, there were in Spain small workshops manufacturing all the parts of the vehicle,
including motor engines. See Estapé-Triay (1997a).
4 “Notas de W.P. Ricart sobre la industria del motor en España”, Ministerio de Industria y Comercio,
January 4, 1946, Expediente Planell/CETA, INI Archives, Madrid.9
The first references of governmental regulation of the Spanish motor vehicle industry
appeared together with the first attempts to reorganise the Spanish economy after the
Civil War. Nevertheless, there had already existed a brilliant but small manufacturing
activity in the previous decades. Thus, the achievements of that period were not at all
wasted. Rather, they were the seed of the productive and technological infrastructure
that facilitated to some extent expansion during the second half of the century.
5
It is possible to distinguish several phases of government regulation regarding the
motor vehicle industry. First, with regard to industrial activity until 1936, the Civil War
meant a disruption of the activities and development achieved during the first decades of
this century. Moreover, the new trends in mass production and mass consumption
associated with the industry made it impossible for the small and artisan based Spanish
producers to keep up. Spain had no firms at all of sufficient size. Moreover, its
enterprises were not using modern methods of production to face the foreign challenge.
The political economy of the industry was run within a protectionist framework.
6
Secondly, within the frame of the ‘Industrial Law Regulation’ between 1939 and
1941, an industrially normative system was established with two objectives: a long term
interventionism planning, and second, import substitution or autarky. Both objectives
according to Farre were coherent with Spain’s international political isolation, the
destruction of its internal productive system and its economic distancing from Europe
right at the beginning of the Second World War. The law of ‘Industries of National
Interest’ of October 24, 1939, established the incentives to the investments of those
activities considered as strategic for the national economy with the use of classical
instruments such as tax benefits, grants and market quotas. The other important law, as
seen elsewhere, was the one that created the National Institute of Industry.
Nevertheless, a different pattern was followed by the manufacturers of industrial
vehicles due to the existence of a well developed technological sector. As a consequence,
it provided the development of a supply and service industry. An important concern of
the state leaders was the manufacturing of trucks because there was a great need for
them since the end of the war. In this regard, two different options were under study. On
the one hand, the establishment of a manufacturing enterprise from the remaining assets
and facilities of the Hispano Suiza of Barcelona, by changing the former board of
management and directors. On the other hand, the establishment of a completely new
concern. The former was the quickest and cheapest solution. By acquiring the old
facilities (incomplete and old-fashioned) as an initial core that could be increased and
completed with new facilities, the company could immediately undertake the production
of trucks and buses. However, in order to carry out such a plan it was necessary first, to
change the actual ‘mentality’ or ‘corporate culture’ that was running Hispano Suiza, that
in the light of experience was totally divorced from the standpoint of a rigorous industrial
policy, and second, that any other activity related with air engines, weapons, etc. had to
be promptly discontinued, because it was already insufficient for the production of trucks
and buses. Third, regarding financial needs, an initial investment of fifty to seventy
million pesetas for the modernisation of the means of production was recognised. The
                                               
5 From a wider historical perspective, Spain was able to enter in the 1980s as the fourth European car
manufacturing country with a production fully multinationalised as well as with a complex
infrastructure of services and suppliers for the industry. This occurred despite the absence of its own
technology. See Farré (1986:27).
6 Royal Decree of December 3, 1926 that established the concept of national manufacturer and to be
awarded a certificate.10
whole program would be run by a team leader composed of fifteen to twenty
collaborators of a leading industrialist, W. Ricart.
7 This team, whose members were
considered to have the highest technical and industrial skills, were already familiar with
mass production at Alfa Romeo.
8 As regards the second possibility, i.e. not taking into
account the workshops of Hispano Suiza, the program in its general lines did not vary
very much from the aforementioned. The initial capital was planned to be around 150
million pesetas. In both cases, yet more especially in the second, it would have been
necessary to set up workshop-schools to train the workers in the use of modern machine
tools.
During the 1940s the Spanish state, through the intermediary of the INI, had made
definitive attempts to develop a national automobile industry with the establishment of
ENASA for the manufacturing of trucks, and the agreement with Fiat for the
manufacture of light cars.
9 Consequently, Ford Motor Ibérica´s (FMI) future plans in
their aim to maintain their organisation and to continue developing their normal activities
were based on the possibility of arousing the interest of the Spanish government in the
co-operation which they could offer in solving the difficult problem which Spanish
agriculture was being confronted with for many years. They felt that if they could
convince the Spanish authorities that they could become a decisive factor in solving the
deficiency of farm machinery, they would in compensation, receive in the automobile
field preferential treatment. FMI felt it deserved a preferential treatment because, Ford
had a long history in Spain, had taken the lead in developing Spanish automotive parts
industries, their social policy, etc. Together with the fact that their prices for the 8 HP
and 10 HP cars were the lowest, these facts would be taken into account in mobilising
the government’s good will towards Ford. Although the prospects of greater activity in
FMI's plant were better owing to the trade agreement signed by Spain with England and
France, which provided for the importation of substantial quantities of cars and trucks,
they felt, however, that something had to be done to provide steady work for the plant in
keeping with their past performance and long establishment in the country.
An approach to the authorities with an offer to manufacture the Fordson Major in
Spain by supplying appropriate machinery and equipment payable with FMI's own
currency, therefore had a good chance of being favourably received. It must be borne in
mind that FMI had entered negotiations with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to
join in with the INI in the manufacturing of the truck, and after two years of discussions
they had refused the proposal, for various reasons. First because they did not think that
the enterprise would be financially sound and second, because they did not want to
accept being controlled by the INI.
10 The scheme sponsored by the Spanish Government
                                               
7 Wifredo Ricart had a long tradition of involvement in the Spanish automobile industry. He had moved
to Italy where he worked for Alfa Romeo. Then, with the new industrial policy of the Francoist regime,
he was called to lead the establishment of the domestic motor manufacturing industry. He position was
as an adviser to INI. According to Suanzes, president of the public holding, Ricart had been “entitled
to direct all the plans for the manufacturing of trucks and engines in Spain” see letter Sirvent to
Planell, Madrid August 3, 1946. Exped. Planell, INI Archives, Madrid.
8 “Notas de W.P. Ricart”, Exped. Planell/CETA, INI Archives, Madrid.
9 The INI decided soon to initiate motor vehicle manufacturing. Its plans are gathered in the following
documents: See folders 243 (year 1942);  355,5 (1942, 1943, 1944, 1947, 1948) INI Archives, Madrid.
10 The scheme sponsored by the Spanish Government under which the INI had been formed for the
purpose of assembling motor vehicles, all the components for which were to be manufactured in Spain.
The Spanish Government wanted to enlist the aid of Ford in this matter and Cooper, President of the
Board of Directors of FMI, had said that every possible assistance could be given but that the Ford
organisation was not prepared to introduce capital into such a venture. He was convinced that the11
under which the INI had been formed for the purpose of assembling motor vehicles, all
the components for which were to be manufactured in Spain. The Spanish Government
wanted to enlist the aid of Ford in this matter and Cooper, President of the Board of
Directors of FMI, had said that every possible assistance could be given but that the Ford
organisation was not prepared to introduce capital into such a venture. He was
convinced that the project outlined could not possibly survive world competition and he
also was of the strong conviction that the problem was being approached from the wrong
angle. The considerations which had brought him to this conclusion was that the future
world pattern was exceedingly uncertain and the United States were anxious to abolish
barriers to international trade and would strongly oppose any import duties designed to
foster home manufacture. The local manufacture of components was profitable only if
the cost was less than the landed cost of import parts. Even allowing for CIF margins,
Spain was not in a position to produce as cheaply as America and, therefore, the local
manufacture of complete motor cars was not a sound proposition. Cooper thought that
the Spanish government, which was not experienced in the manufacture of motor
vehicles, had to be advised accordingly. He did not believe that the major competitors of
Ford would have been prepared to support a scheme such as the Government proposed.
In this regard, the local general manager said that throughout Spain there were a number
of ordnance factories which, as they were not producing, were merely accumulating
costly overheads. In Cooper’s view, the obvious solution was that the Spanish
Government should turn these factories over to the production of those components
which could be produced more cheaply than they could be imported from America. The
existing FMI plant could then be used to assemble vehicles from parts provided partly by
Spain and partly by America. But it was unsound to expect FMI to purchase locally
made parts at a higher price than that at which they could be imported. Only a reasonable
proportion of the overheads incurred by ordnance factories should, therefore, be added
to the price of locally manufactured parts.
Therefore, Ford had to be prepared to face an attempt from the INI to interfere with
the new proposal, because according to existing laws any enlargement of activities or
establishment of new activities by any existing concern had to be authorised by the
Ministry of Industry and Commerce. A very important reason why this was necessary
besides complying with existing laws was because the Ministry was deciding on the
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allocation of raw materials, which was vital to any manufacturing enterprise. No
production of any kind was possible without the full support of the authorities and the
preferential allotment of all raw materials. The following ideas were therefore submitted
to implement a program of future development in Spain: in two of the three basic groups
of Ford’s products -cars, trucks and tractors- the Spanish government was already partly
committed with FIAT and Spanish investors to manufacture light cars and also possibly
light vans, and with ENASA for the manufacture of a heavy type of truck. However, no
definitive arrangements had been made to manufacture a medium truck in the two to four
ton category nor for a medium sized passenger car. Furthermore, no definitive
commitments had been made or disclosed to manufacture tractors.
Ford Iberica’s plan therefore called for specific models in each of the three basic
groups mentioned. Tractors and other agricultural machinery were taken to prepare the
ground with authorities for the other two. The Spanish government was conscious of the
necessity to mechanise agriculture. The era of low farm wages in Spain was about to
finish and the need for increased output of foodstuffs was imperative. It wanted the
figure of 1,200 working tractors, to reach 2,000 or more in the near future. As regards
cars, with difficulties in obtaining and paying for petrol products, Spain had had to ration
gasoline and lubricants for automotive and industrial use. As a result of this and of the
system of taxation based on horse power rating, cars of low horse power were being
given preference by government and by private users. That Dagenham made passenger
vehicles which were classed at 8 and 9 HP units respectively, appeared much more
promising. These cars cost less to buy and to operate and had the advantage of being
purchasable in pounds sterling, which although scarce, were not quite so difficult to get
as dollars.
Therefore, assuming FMI’s relations with the Spanish government were re-established
on a more favourable basis as a result of an agreement over tractors initially, and on
truck development on a longer term basis, they should aim to get as part of the overall
arrangement a larger share of imports of British cars which, if obtained in sufficient
quantities, would have placed FMI in a position to resume local assembly of the chassis
only, for which they were already prepared, and for body frames to be brought in white
to be trimmed and painted there in Barcelona. Local body frame assembly could be taken
up latterly. A general understanding with the government about Ford's future activities in
Spain was an indispensable condition of its development in the light car field. Parallel to
the local passenger car assembly would have been the creation of sources of supply of
local parts to integrate these units. Such items as batteries, wheels, tires, radiators,
chassis and seat springs, front axle, hubs, mufflers, trim, glass, paint, etc. could then be
purchased in Spain, as they were in pre-Civil War days. In the more distant future lied
the possibility of making an engine which could be used to fit into a medium priced car in
the 14-16 HP range for which there was a good market in Spain and would not have
competed with the 9 HP passenger vehicle which INI and FIAT had agreed to build co-
operatively in the country.
The home office did not give, however, support to the proposals of the subsidiary.
They argued that the prospective volume was not sufficient to make them a sound long-
term economic proposition. Secondly, in their opinion Spain's foreign trade especially
with the UK, was likely to improve and it would probably be able, before long, to import
automotive products from the UK, at a price much below the local manufacturing cost
which could be attained from Spain's limited volume potential. Third, Ford was not
inclined to engage in a joint venture for local manufacturing; to do so would ‘morally’
commit Ford to continue financial assistance if and when the locally manufactured13
products could not compete with imported products. In conclusion, the home office
recommended the Barcelona firm to develop the company's established policy of
maximum local purchase, so long as this was profitable.
 11
During the period 1945-54, Ford Motor Company was facing nationalistic pressure in
Spain. The consequence was that finally, in May 1954, Ford Dearborn sold its
participation in the Spanish company to local interests. Ford US had argued that the size
of the market and various other factors made it impossible to continue in Spain.
However, the reality seemed to contradict this opinion. In effect, the year 1954
constituted a turning point in the Spanish motor industry. When Ford left Spain, SEAT
was constituted and from then on the Spanish motor industry saw a remarkable increase.
Other foreign companies such as Renault and Citroen set up concerns in the country.
What seems to be one of the main reason for Ford's departure were the limited
opportunities left in the business field to Ford: the tractor and light truck were
unattractive to Ford Motor Company. On the other hand, another important
consideration preventing Ford from engaging in local production, as pointed out by
Wilkins and Hill, was the insistence of the government that a controlling interest in any
joint venture should rest in Spanish hands. This stipulation was disliked by the Ford top
management in Dearborn, which felt that even a majority interest in its foreign companies
was unsatisfactory and wanted a hundred per cent ownership in all of them.
12 Finally,
though Ford Motor Company sold its subsidiary entirely to local capital, it nevertheless
established commercial and technical agreements with the new ‘national’ company,
Motor Iberica. Thus, the latter developed its products, trucks and tractors, with Ford’s
technical aid. Moreover, Ford preserved its Spanish commercial network that allowed
the American company to sell its products through a well established sales network.
13
Ultimately, the decision to leave Spain still remained profitable for Ford because it
assured them at least ten years (according to the terms of the contract) of business in the
country.
To conclude, it stands clear that our case study fits in with recent studies that stress
the negative consequences that state decisions of this period produced in the long run. In
effect, the intentions of Ford clashed with those of the Spanish government, for the
economic nationalism of Franco presented government’s interventionism in car
manufacture as the only possible alternative for the production of automobiles in Spain.
As San Roman has pointed out recently, SEAT was for a long time considered the
prototype of the paradigmatic company of Franco’s regime.
14 The incapacity of private
enterprise was the main argument used to entrust the car industry to the INI. The INI
used its power to block any private initiative and assume the creation of the first national
mass production motor vehicle company as its own. Within the car industry, the INI did
not protect national companies but, on the contrary, defended its own projects. Although
Spanish national attempts during autarky were scarce and small, both General Motors
and Ford presented their projects for the building up of a national industry. The reaction
against foreign capital and the defence of “national”, “sectarian” and “patriotic” interests
prevented Spain from developing a modern industry earlier. As a contemporary observer
pointed out, “an apparent government policy which upon control by INI of all new
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automobile developments in Spain, has been the stumbling bloc which has been
preventing big concerns like Ford and General Motors from operating on a major scale in
Spain. In effect, INI prevented the establishment in Spain of any major motor vehicle
industry it did not control.”
15 In this regard, after the establishment of the industrial
legislation frame between 1939 and 1941, two decisions were taken in order to develop
in the medium and long term a national motor vehicle industry. First was the creation of
the “Empresa National de Autocamiones, S.A.” (ENASA) in 1946. This firm was
created from the remaining assets and the human and technological capital of Hispano
Suiza. The second decision was the creation of the “Sociedad Española de Automóviles
de Turismo” (SEAT) in 1949. The INI capital participation in Seat was one third, the
rest was divided in two, tin which Fiat held one third and private Spanish capital held the
other. Fiat provided the technological assistance. These two firms replaced the American
multinationals with the declared objective of substituting imported cars. The
establishment of SEAT was immediately followed by  Fasa (1951), a branch of Renault.
A market so extremely protected and short of goods as the Spanish will attract foreign
manufacturers in the following decades.
4. Comparative perspectives. The cases of Egypt and Brazil
Spain was not the only case where Ford was facing nationalistic pressures during the
decades of the 40s and 50s. For example, in Egypt, from 1945 on, Ford found itself in an
increasingly restricted political and financial environment, which its executives were not
able to dominate. Ford’s investment decisions had to take account of nationalist
sensitivities and could not be based on purely economic and financial realities. The
decade and a half from 1945 to 1960, thus serve as a test of how well Ford fared in its
relations with an increasingly nationalist and watchful Egyptian government. The
emphasis on Egyptianisation was made palpable by the enactment of a 1947 law that
imposed a number of requirements on firms operating in Egypt, including, of course, the
Ford Motor Company, which in spite of being completely owned by Ford Investment
Company, was juridically an Egyptian limited liability company. For new firms, the law
stipulated that at least 51 per cent of a company’s equity capital had to be offered to
Egyptian nationals and 40 per cent of the places on their Board of Directors be Egyptians
as well. In spite of this, Ford remained optimistic about its future in Egypt. In 1950, it
established a new and larger plant in Alexandria. This move came about because General
Motors and Chrysler were also planning to established themselves in Egypt. Until the
1952 coup, Ford Egypt had fared well in an environment of strong nationalist sensitivity.
It had used its affiliates and business connections around the world to overcome currency
restrictions, and though its divided and currency negotiations with Egyptian bureaucrats
had not been easy, they had been satisfactory. However, after 1956, the pressure on all
private businesses increased greatly. Nor did Ford have its way on its two most
important business decisions of the late 1950s. In 1957, it contemplated liquidating its
Egyptian business, but was forced to conclude that the financial penalties likely to be
imposed by the Egyptian government would be too punitive to make this outcome
possible. Later in 1959-1960, it made an offer to create an automotive manufacturing
plant in the country. It did so because the company was on the defensive vis-à-vis an
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increasingly regulatory and intrusive Egyptian government and wanted to show a
willingness to participate in the local push to industrialisation.
 16
The development of the motor industry in Brazil is another interesting case. In 1956,
the country had instituted a program to install an automotive industry. As Shapiro (1991)
has illustrated the plan restricted imports and forced multinational automotive companies
to choose between abandoning the lucrative Brazilian market and, with the help of
financial incentives, producing vehicles with 90-95 per cent Brazilian-made content
within only five years. Although cars and trucks had been assembled in Brazil since 1919
-when Ford was the first to set up an assembly plant, followed by General Motors in
1925- the industry remained completely dependent on imported kits, primarily from
Detroit. Ford had no intention to produce motor vehicles in the country. Before the
Second World War, the company dominated Brazilian passenger car sales; between 1935
and 1940, annual exports from Ford US and Canada averaged 42 percent of wholesale
deliveries into Brazil. Because of Ford’s historic contribution to the automotive sector
and its market dominance, the Brazilians went out of their way to elicit the company’s
co-operation. Ford’s local management had also tried to impress on Dearborn the
seriousness of Brazilian intentions. The government asked Ford-Brazil for a report on
how Brazil might develop a local industry, and the Brazilian assistant manager, complied.
Ford Dearborn adopted an intransigent position from which it scarcely deviated in the
following years. In February 1953, for example, the director of President Vargas’s sub-
comission on motor vehicles, led a Brazilian delegation to Ford’s facilities in Dearborn.
On its arrival, Ford did everything possible to convince them that producing trucks in
Brazil made no sense because of the country’s small market and lack of infrastructure.
Being the first motor company to establish itself in Brazil and dominating the market,
why did Ford not try to made more of it? Subsequent interviews with Ford managers of
the period indicate that some viewed Ford’s late entry as a mistake. In retrospect, they
offer various explanations for Ford’s absence from this market segment. Some attribute
it to Dearbonr’s lack of knowledge or interest in international affairs. Ford International,
located in New York until 1956, was still somewhat of a stepchild in the organisation.
Ford was not manufacturing in any less developed country at that time, and had recently
sold its interest in Spain and liquidated in India rather than comply with the local capital
requirements of those countries’ automotive programs. Ford Brazil, though profitable,
had been relatively marginal to Ford’s overall operations. Ford had brought virtually no
new capital into the country since it had begun assembling there thirty-seven years
earlier.
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5. State Entrepreneurship and Multinational Enterprises (1955-1973)
In the post-war year Spanish industrial expansion was hindered by insufficient
production of electricity, shortages of steel and cement, lack of skilled labour and
management, inadequate private investment, a level of foreign exchange earnings too low
to cover imports of capital goods, and the autarkic bias of the country's rulers [Catalán
1995]. However, at the beginning of the 1960s, these weaknesses were overcome, and
Spain’s industrial pattern was transformed from one dominated by textiles into one in
which the metallurgical, chemical and building industries, and power production were
predominant. One of the main features regarding this process was when the year 1957
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brought into government the team of technocrats who were to introduce a new economic
policy to reconcile rapid industrial growth and its consequences. Moreover, foreign
investment was encouraged by allowing the repatriation of  profits, and the importation
of advanced technology by permitting royalty payments . The goal was to shift the
economy away from an inward looking country towards an outward looking one, where
manufacturing sectors would play a major role. The automobile industry was called to
play a major role in the economic boom of the 1960s.
The spectacular growth of the 1960s had been attributed to three main developments
[Donges1971]. First, the trade liberalisation measures initiated in 1959 that encouraged
the import of capital goods which in turn contributed to a renovation of much of Spain's
outdated capital equipment. Second, the launch of a plan of action to promote the export
of manufactured goods initiated in 1959 with the devaluation of the peseta. Moreover,
among the main aspects of the new policy were the provision of export subsidies to
producers, exempting them from paying indirect taxes on foreign sales, rebates of import
duties paid on raw materials, spare parts and capital equipment used towards the
production of exports, and financial assistance to exporters. Third, as highlighted by
Donges, the external financing of Spanish industry reflected a profound change in official
attitudes towards foreign private capital. However, later interpretations of Spain's
industrial boom years argue that Spain's industrialisation policy in the 1960s was still
resolutely protectionist. Foreign investment was of crucial importance to the
industrialisation process, not least because of Spanish industry's unwillingness to
undertake research and development [Braña, Buesa, and Molero 1984]. However, in the
motor vehicle industry it was expected that the technological basis established in the
industry would bring positive effects to other sectors. The technological requirements for
automobiles would force technological improvements in related supply industries.
Therefore, the automobile industry would raise labour productivity because of the its
technologically trained workforce. In an attempt to tackle the long-standing weaknesses
of the reduced dimension of enterprises, shortage of capital, technological backwardness
and low productivity, Spain's policy makers pursued a strategy of industrial
concentration.
As it has been abovementioned, the aim of the INI was to create the infrastructure for
industrial development. In so doing, it invested public funds in those areas where,
according to the public holding, private capital was unwilling to risk a low return or in
enterprises which needed state aid to get off the ground. The automobile industry was an
example of the latter: in the late 1940s, the INI set about establishing a broader-based
automotive industry. For instance, during the forties the INI bought up the old Hispano-
Suiza: the new concern, ENASA, first embarked on the production of an expensive sport
car, superbly engineered and presumably meant to 'fit' a domestic market dominated by a
small number of the very rich. That this car was a commercial failure was less important
than the fact that Pegaso became a mass producer of commercial vehicles. A spectacular
growth subsequently took place in new industries, and as in all modern economies, the
car industry provides a test case. When the SEAT factory was set up in Barcelona in
1952, its managers were concerned that the market might not absorb a hundred cars a
month; by 1975 Ford, Chrysler, Citroen, Renault and Seat were producing three quarters
of a million vehicles a year. However, these dramatic figures are in part a mere reflection
of the abysmal point of departure in 1940 and the restrictive policies of the years that
followed.
SEAT was brought into being to produce Fiat cars under licence. After Seat-Fiat,
Fasa-Renault was the other major case in the development of the modern Spanish17
automobile industry. The government gave authorisation to Renault to set up a concern
in order to produce the 4 HP car. The type of car selected, the Renault 4 HP, was
considered by the authorities a suitable one because it did compete directly with the Fiat
1400 that the new formed company, Seat, was about to produce. The establishment of
the production program meant that Renault had to fulfil the following conditions. First,
on initiating the assembly of vehicles in series it had to be guaranteed that the value of all
materials and parts of Spanish origin or manufacture would represent at least twenty five
per cent of the total cost price of vehicles. Once the manufacture was started assembly
operation in series would not begin until an output of at least 200 cars per month could
be assured, and sale of cars to the public would not be started until proof was given that
55% of the sales prices once finished with the plant corresponded to disbursements in
Spain. Secondly, one year after the start of assembly, this 50% threshold was to be raised
to 70%. Thirdly, three years after the assembly process had begun, and at the most, five
years after the date of publication of the this authorisation, such a percentage was to be
raised to 90% and engine, clutch and gearbox were to be comprised therein. Fourth, six
years after the publication of the authorisation, production was to be made entirely in
Spanish workshops. Finally, the supply of raw materials was subject to the local
production programs of parts previously approved by the administration, taking into
account the results reached in the local production of various parts, as well as the
availability of raw materials in the country.
18
The conclusion of the US-Spanish agreement signed in Madrid in 1953 encoured
private investors. And, the economic reforms and the growth of tourism following the
1959 devaluation provoked a further wave of initiatives. Leyland had acquired shares in
ENASA. BMC,  in collaboration with Nueva Montana Quijano, had acquired a 20
hectare located near Pamplona for the production of up to 80,000 Minis, and possibly
1100s, a year. Renault had increased its share in Fasa, an associated company, from 15 to
50% and bought control of FAMESA, an important component manufacturer. Ford
which held first place among importers (a close second, interestingly, was
Czechoslovakia’s Skoda), had during 1964 been discussing with Motor Iberica the
possibility of producing its German-designed Taunus 12M. IMOSA was to make
industrial vehicles in alliance with VW. It could be argued that the Spanish motor
industry already sustained too many firms for its good health, and that concentration was
needed to increase production runs, improve quality and bring prices down. SEAT
(whose 600 and 1500 cc models held 62% of the market), Fasa Renault and Enasa had
political as well as economic reasons to be confident. And, in the private sector, Citroen
(25% of the commercial market), Motor Iberica and Barreiros were firmly established.
19
It has been argued that the Spanish state had for a long time gone in pursuit of a
domestic industry capable of manufacturing a ‘popular’ car on a large scale basis. To this
end, there was at the beginning of the 1950s a certain optimism, across Spain, regarding
the possibility of producing automobiles. Several firms such as Eucort and Fasa had
already undertaken the production of automobiles.
20 This production, however, was
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carried out by the assemblage of parts supplied by a multitude of small local workshops.
It is worth noting that the major part of  these workshops did not posses modern means
of mass production, rather, it was the case that all of them lacked the means and skills for
such a kind of production. Conversely, according to Ricart, the chances of developing an
industry locally that could be technically advanced and economically efficient depended
on a different strategy.
21 In effect, according to him it was first necessary to develop a
supporting network of ancillary industry. This would absorb much of the work that
would otherwise have gone to only one factory; in this sense, ENASA was considered an
example to follow. Second, apart from a few cases, notable but exceptional, the Spanish
ancillary industry was not ready to supply a modern large scale manufacturing industry
mainly because of the quality deficiency of its products (dimensions, technological
treatment of production); and secondly, the weak and outdated capital equipment,
technically backward and with prices incompatible with those  required by a modern
motor industry. In effect, during the years of scarcity and isolation, the workshops that
produced spare parts were used to do so selling low quality products at high prices.
Italy, for example, a country to a certain extent comparable to Spain, had developed a
truly modern motor vehicle industry. In effect, 99% of its production was carried out by
Fiat, Bianchi, Masseratti, Ferrari, Alfa Romeo, Lancia, and O.M. All of them possessed
complete manufacturing workshops.
22 In Sweden, for example, the state had given all
kinds of advantages to Scania-Vavis and Volvo; both of them were producing all sort of
motor parts in their workshops and importing just the ‘proprietary units’ (generally from
the US) that they still were unable to produce by themselves.
23 In Spain, ENASA had
managed to increase the quality of the automobile electric equipment that had since been
produced in low quality but production was not on a large scale basis. Its efforts were
towards the consolidation of some specialised mass production industries in clutches and
shock absorbers. Moreover, both the CETA and ENASA had attempted to developed
ancillary industry and produce gear boxes and brake systems locally, however, without
any success whatsoever. These negative outcomes had confirmed both the difficulty itself
and the infant stage of the domestic mechanical industry. It was thought, therefore, that
in order to be able to produce a ‘popular’ car on a large scale it was necessary to have
rationalised workshops with modern purpose machine tools and with an enormous
capital investment. In this sense, Fiat had established for SEAT a program based on the
establishment of modern workshops.
To sum up, the manufacturing of a low price vehicle was only possible with the
modernisation of the capital equipment and enabling high level of production. Second, in
the limited Spanish market, with low levels of income (and therefore low purchasing
power) and a low population, it was not logical to produce just for the domestic market.
Production therefore had to aim at export markets equally. Finally, in a country with a
low income per capita ratio, it was only possible to manufacture quality items with a high
proportion of the workforce. It was their belief that Spain could undertake the
production of specialised motor vehicles with a high ratio of workforce and then export
them.
24
After the period of big recession of the 1940s and, in part, the 1950s, a new state
strategy more open to foreign capital, facilitated the creation of the modern Spanish
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automobile industry. It will be necessary, therefore, to introduce a bargaining framework
of analysis that considers both state intervention and multinational enterprises in order to
understand the development of this industry. Some decades later, at the end of the
1970s, the industry had become dominated by multinational enterprises.
25 Thus, in little
more than a decade three more companies were created - producers of private cars and
by-products Citroën Hispania (1957), Chrysler Barreiros (afterwards the Peugeot Talbot
España, 1963) and AUTHI (1967), all of them subsidiary firms of multinationals Citroën,
Chrysler (sold to Peugeot) and the British Motor Corporation. Finally, the map of the
Spanish automobile industry was completed with the establishment of Ford Motor
Company (1972) and General Motors (1979), both of them coming to Spain for the
second time.
26
Spain developed and expanded automobile production during the 1960s and 1970s
from a set of based-owned firms and imported technology. The Spanish industry grew
with extraordinary speed, from 50,000 passenger cars in 1961 to more than 700,000 in
1973, an annual increase of nearly 25%. This was the result of a young industry that was
dominated by foreign manufacturers. Seat-Fiat and Fasa Renault were by far the largest
companies in the period before 1973. Then, with its establishment in 1972 , Ford called
for Spain to play a major role in its European operations. Nevertheless, it should be
remembered that, although the modern industry has taken off in the second half of this
century, it did not start up form nothing. All the developments from the very beginning
of the century have timidly to be considered. The nationalistic policy after the Civil War
caused distortions that particularly affected those firms already involved in the
automobile business.
A subsequent period might be traced between 1945 and 1963 with the establishment
of ENASA in 1946 and the creation of SEAT in 1949. Around 1950, a service and
supply industry triggered by ENASA and SEAT began to develop. This first
development after two decades fixed the basis for the further development of the
industry in the 1970s and 1980s. Apart from the most relevant cases mentioned above,
others attempts have to be considered such as that of Barreiros in the manufacturing of
tractors, trucks, and buses. On the components side, it is worth mentioning the cases of
Femsa (electrical equipment), Fraymon and Bendibérica (brakes system) and Perkins
Hispania (diesel engines).
27 This period also saw  the appearance of several attempts at
the manufacture vehicles from artisan methods, such as Eucort
28 and Biscuter, as well as
more serious cases of the first foreign multinational enterprises entering the Spanish
market through the establishment of joint ventures with Spanish firms, such as Renault
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with Fasa (Fasa Renault), Massey Ferguson with Motor Ibérica, Citroen Hispania and
Land Rover Santana.
29
The next period covers the years 1963-1964. In the context of the First Development
Plan (Primer Plan de Desarrollo), a new decree was proclaimed that established a regime
of free installation, enlargement and transfer of some specific industries in Spain. For the
first time, the law established economic, technical and size conditions for the settlement
of industries in different sectors. In the case of motor vehicles, the production plant
capacity was to be cars (75,000 units/year); trucks and buses (8,000 units/year); tractors
(10,000 units/years) and motorcycles (25,000 units/year). All the vehicles produced
within the first two years of manufacture were to constituted of a minimum of  70% of
national component over the manufactured value of the vehicle. After the two first years,
it should increase to 90%. It states clearly that by that time there should exist the notion
of an emerging industry with a high degree of national integration that had to go beyond
the simple assembly industry as was the case with other emerging economies, mainly in
Latin America [Bennett and Sharpe 1985;  Jenkins 1977; Shapiro 1991, 1994].
In the midst of Spain’s economic boom, several weaknesses were apparent. In effect,
as a contemporary observer pointed out that Spanish private enterprise, reared in an
autarkic hothouse, was not yet enterprise enough. The state owned sector was ill co-
ordinated, had neither the weight nor the prestige of the great nationalised and semi-
public industries which had contributed so robustly to economic progress in France.
Excessive investment in real estate at the expense of manufacturing was one of the big
pressure points in the economy. Another was the too rapid rise in government
expenditure [The Economist 1966: 1275]. Some new industries had been set up with so
much protection and government-backed capital that they could scarcely have failed
commercially, but the real weakness lay in the unwieldy bulk of Spanish private industry
built up before 1958. In a protected market where prices were controlled, there was little
incentive to expand (except for favoured state enterprises); most profits before 1958
were therefore distributed and private industry became massively descapitalised. In those
years before 1958, the Spanish commercial banks, and in particular the biggest eight,
gained a stranglehold on financing industry. Statistics may suggest the stranglehold was
being broken, but in reality all that the figures really show was that the major part of
private industry was controlled by the banks who did not publish meaningful financial
returns. Industry was still closely tied to over-geared bank capital [The Economist, 5
August 1967: 511].
During the period 1964-1972, a new minimum size of capacity was established for the
automobile industry. This stood at 125,000 units/year for cars and, 12,000 units/year for
trucks and/or buses During the first years of the 1960s with a period of general economic
development, the Spanish market was beginning to be taken in to account by the
European manufacturers who had finished with post-war reconstruction and had,
therefore, an excess of capacity impossible to be introduced on to the Spanish market
due to the protectionist legislation. Thus, several firms started to approach to the Spanish
market: British Leyland, Chrysler and Volkswagen. This activities were still subjected to
the conditions for national components, 70 per cent of manufactured value in the first
year to be increased to 90 per cent in the third. The period came to its end with the
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signature of the 'Spanish preferential treatment' with the European Economic
Community.
By the mid-sixties, Spain had become one of the fastest-growing markets for cars and
commercial vehicles in the world: from only three cars per thousand inhabitants in 1950,
the density had grown to twenty-one per thousand, or a total of around 700,000.
Moreover, while imported vehicles, paying customs duties of over 60 per cent,
accounted for only eight or nine per cent of current sales, domestic production, almost
entirely in joint ventures with foreign multinational manufacturers, was being expanded
rapidly.
30 Exports had expanded rapidly. For instance, SEAT had had great success in
exporting the Fiat models which were no longer made in Turin. Renault was making its
R4 and R8 in Spain, after they had been  phased out in France. And Citroen produced its
GS in Spain for export to non-European markets. SEAT (55% of the market) increased
production to 500,000 cars a year by 1976. Renault (24% of the market) reckoned on
200,000 within three years.
In conclusion, as regarded the first specific regulating activity for the automobile
industry, the main characteristics of the motor vehicle industry in Spain at the beginning
of the 1970s were as follow: first, production mainly destined to the domestic market
under severe protection against imports; Second, a high degree of nationalisation as a
consequence of both the strong integration of the manufacturers and the existence of an
important auxiliary industry; Third, complete external technological dependence.
6. Organisational developments (1955-1973)
After the stagnating 1940's, the creation of the "Comisión Nacional de Productividad"
(National Productivity Commission) in 1952 and, just afterwards, the by-products of the US-
Spain military agreement of 1953, opened a new period.  For some twelve years the activity
of managerial retraining and of professional development was very much intensified. Many
"productivity missions", public grants, new committees, new specialized journals and,
eventually, even new management schools, built new managerial capabilities in Spain's
business world [Herrero, 1990].   The main paths for the introduction of new management
techniques were the consulting firms.  They used to be of French or US origin, and the first to
operate were created in 1952 (TEA) and 1953 (Bedaux).
By 1960, De Miguel and Linz observed the emergence of a new pattern of specialized
management in a large sample of in-depth interviews with business leaders [Linz & De
Miguel, 1963; De Miguel & Linz, 1964].  Their sociologically oreinted enquire allowed the
first major collective photograph of the business world with a lot of attention being payed to
the management of human resources and to internal organization schemes.
More than through schools, programs, grants, journals and consulting firms, Spanish
entrepreneurs and managers have been exposed to large and efficient business organizations
mainly through contact with multinational firms.  They began to land in Spain by the end of
the 1950s.  Just when Ford abandoned Spain, other automobile manufacturers (French ones)
began to think of investing in Spain.  The set of international economic agreements subscribed
by the Spanish Governement between 1958 and 1962, and the passing of a law accepting
foreign capital majority for the new investments, induced international capital to flow to
Spain. The amount of foreign investment was really huge in Spanish terms and in very few
                                               
30 The Spanish government had announced new and easier rules for foreign car firms: only 50 per cent
of the components needed to be Spanish-made in place of the previous 70 per cent minimum. Ford had
recently been diversifying some component orders to Spain that used to be placed in Britain. Chrysler,
Fiat and even British Leyland had been buying more Spanish components.22
years the enterpreneurial landscape changed completely.  The multinationals landed very
quickly into the newly opened country.  In no more than twelve years, their presence became
so important as to be perceived as a danger by a new generation of nationalist leaders
[Roldán, Muñoz and Serrano, 1978].  The professional careers of top and middle managers
happened in foreign-owned firms.  They represented newly arrived capital, with expansion
plans and new organizational, marketing and industrial techniques.  They were much more
willing to value academic training and foreign language abilities than the old fashioned
national firms.  Slowly, but firmly, Spanish managerial talent was located and promoted by
multinational firms.  A market for managers developed and it was useful even for family-
owned or state-owned firms -the two most reluctant antimanagerial groupings in the business
world.
Family-controlled firms have been cautious in their organizational growth, mainly in
manufacturing. There still are many family firms of medium and even large size.  Most of the
firms that are not quoted in the stock exchange are family-owned. "El Corte Inglés" (the
Spanish leader in sales) is the most famous one, but not the only one.  The lobby "Instituto de
la Empresa Familiar" (Family Firm Institute) was created precisely to group many of these
medium and large size firms that are mainly worried with sucession law and with the passing
of ownership from generation to generation and that survived the arrival of foreign capital in
the sixties, the labor unrest of the seventies, the industrial crisis of the eighties and the weight
of the welfare state in the nineties.  For them, organizational growth has always been
problematic.  Some have bet for quick internationalization, but on small niches of the world
market, feasible to supervise.  Some have accepted growth, but depending on a very loyal
group of middle and top managers, partly payed with company shares.
Most of the manufacturing firms that do no qualify as family-owned, are branches of
multinationals or will become so.  Many arrived to Spain during the period 1960-1973 and
from 1985 to 1992.  There were also very signicant transfers of ownership from Spanish
families or shareholders to international groups.  Each liberalization has meant a tremendous
challenge to the more inward-looking Spanish firms.  The opportunity to jump to an open
market or to jump to European markets existed, but huge financing and proprietary
technology was needed.  The risk was high and there were many cases of shareholders
prefering to sell their lot at a very attractive price instead of betting for a very risky future.
The rise of multi-divisionally Spanish-based firms was slow.  There is nothing like a clear-
cut success story of the development of multidivisionalization in Spain.  The large pre-war
firms were functionally developed, but were far from becoming multudivisional.  After the
war, most of them had to reduce their activities.  The Bank of Spain, heavily involved as
private firm into the management of the C.A.Tabacos, lost it. The mining firms were under
pressure to open its shareholdings to Spanish interests.  Others were nationalized.  Only big
banks increased their size, and their industrial investments created something like a
multidivisional organization.  In the early 1960s, a law was passed that enabled banks to
divide their activities into commercial banks and industrial banks, easing the monitoring of
their more risky, long-term business interests.
Not even the INI created a  multidivisional structure [Martín Aceña & Comín, 1990]. The
variety of industrial sectors where the INI was present forced the emerging of a real
organizational investment.  Patterns of complex organizational patterns developed during the
forties and fifties.  As long as Suanzes chaired the INI, this investment had a well-defined
goal.  Its major strength was the impressive length of service of the main top managers
(fifteen to twenty-five years!).  But after his dismissal, in 1963, the following presidents
managed the INI without any clear goal in mind.  The end of the autarky dream was also the
end of the "raison d'être" of INI.  The new chairmans concentrated their efforts in improving23
the organizational structure, and a real  multidivisional structure slowly emerged.  Its first
complete picture was defined and approved as late as 1976, after the death of Franco and
when the INI became fully managed by specialized managers.
The high rates of growth of the 60s and early 70s allowed a few Spanish industrial firms to
plan a multidiviosional development.  We know of two clear cases in point: Altos Hornos de
Vizcaya (AHV) and Unión de Explosivos Rio Tinto (UERT).  The former, a steel works
created in 1901 through merger, was for half a century the largest Spanish steel making firm.
AHV resisted pretty well the increased competition of newly created large state-owned
firms like ENSIDESA, and managed to modernize its assets during the 60s with the technical
and financial help of US Steel.  By 1970 AHV was emnbarked in a intense industrial
diversification, developing brand new divisions.  The industrial crisis of the mid-70s stopped
it.  For two decades AHV has been involved in an implosive trend that has eventually brought
the firm to complete disappearance.  UERT was the outcome of the nationalization of Rio
Tinto (Cía. Española de Minas de Rio Tinto) plus its merger, in 1970, with the chemical firm
Unión Española de Explosivos. The resulting firm decided to fully exploit its economies of
scale and scope and began to buy firms that brought to UERT complementary branches of
activity in the chemical sector.  By the late 1970s it organized in a multidivisonal way.
Nevertheless, the internal reorganization was too limited to cut down costs and to allow
UERT to survive in a an ever increasingly competitive environment.  The oil second crisis of
1979 was fatal for UERT. The early 1980s were a financial desaster for UERT.  The landing
of the Kuwait Investment Office in Spain, mostly oriented to chemical investment, brought a
solution to UERT headaches: a merger with Cros, creating ERCROS, and the selling of most
of its non-chemical divisions. The downsizing was completed during and after the Kuwait
war, when KIO began to withdraw from its Spanish interests.
Conclusion
The changes in regime (political, economical, legal) have meant major alterations in
business ownership and in organizational strategies.  This happened in Spain many times since
1930. The civil war, the  autarky, the liberalization of 1960, the oil crisis shock and its
aftermath (industrial and banking crisis), coupled with the shock of the change in political
régime and its social counterpart -the increased strength of trade unions-, theentrance in the
EEC, ... all these have been major changes in régime, sharply felt by Spanish-centered firms.
The outcome has been the inability to build adequate organizational structures.  Each period
has promoted a particular kind of organizations and managers that may have been completely
unfitted for the following period.  The managers educated to deal with trade unions in the
1930s were of no use in the 1940s when trade unions were completely illegalized. Those
ideally suited to the military-engineering approach of the autarky were a disaster for the new
market-oriented era of the 1960s.  Both were unable to resist the years of high trade-unionism
during the transition to democracy period (1973-1978) and of soaring energy costs.  Even the
new class of  young managers has not found easy at all to survive in the more competitive
business environment post-1986, when Spain entered into the EEC.
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